Reforming Epistemology

This is a paper that I wrote on Alvin Plantinga's article, On Taking Belief in God as Basic. It is somewhat in the vein of my last post in that it shows the criticisms that some Christian thinkers have of modernity. While it is not explicitly postmodern, this type of argument can lend itself to postmodern thought.

The question of God’s existence is one that must be asked by every serious thinker. Throughout the history of the debate there have always been those coming down on either side who could present clear, reasoned arguments for their positions. Certainly, wherever and whenever the statement has been made that God does exist, there have always been those who are willing to dissent. Despite these dissenters, it would appear that an affirmation of the existence of God has been the majority report in most periods of history. It could even be said of certain eras, such as the Middle Ages, that belief in God was all but universal (at least among Western thinkers). However, in his article, On Taking Belief in God as Basic, Alvin Plantinga points out that there are a significant number of modern philosophers who not only deny God’s existence but state that a disbelief in God must be assumed from the outset if one is to be intellectually responsible. The basic premise that this belief is based on is the claim that there is insufficient evidence to believe in God. Plantinga, in the tradition of the Protestant Reformers, wants to show that not only is belief in God plausible and intellectually responsible, but that it can also be considered a basic belief, or a belief upon which all of an individual’s other beliefs are based.

Plantinga begins the essay by noting what he refers to as the “evidentialist objection to theistic belief.” This view supported by thinkers such as W.K. Clifford, Bertrand Russell, and Antony Flew, among others, states that there is “insufficient evidence” for belief in God. This view does not necessarily claim that God does not exist or that he could not exist, but simply that there is not enough evidence to determine whether or not he does exist. While this view does not necessitate God’s nonexistence, it does make the claim that belief in God cannot be held responsibly. For an evidentialist, any belief that is held must be backed by sufficient evidence of its truth value. An individual’s beliefs affect not only himself but others as well. If he holds beliefs on insufficient evidence and someone is harmed by this belief or a repercussion of the belief, then the individual is morally responsible for holding a belief that they did not have sufficient evidence for. In light of these responsibilities to hold proper beliefs, it looks as though belief in God cannot responsibly be retained because there is a lack of evidence to make this belief irrefutable.

While Plantinga affirms that some type of responsibility regarding our beliefs must be accepted, he questions the strict sense in which an evidentialist would define these responsibilities. He offers three alternative ways in which intellectual obligations could be understood. First, they could be understood in a utilitarian sense, requiring that all intellectual endeavors make an attempt to provide for the good of as many people as possible. Secondly, intellectual obligations could be viewed aretetically, attempting to encourage “intellectual virtues” in oneself and in others. Finally, they could be construed deontologically. Plantinga describes this view as a “pure ethics of obligation.” This understanding would be representative of the evidentialist, requiring that a belief be held only if it can be shown to be true beyond any doubt. So, as Plantinga attempts to show here, while there certainly are intellectual responsibilities that must be fulfilled in forming beliefs, the evidentialist criterion that would seem to rule out belief in God appears to be only one way of understanding what these responsibilities entail.

As Plantinga goes on to explain, the evidentialist objection corresponds with classical foundationalism. Classical foundationalism would say that all beliefs are based on more basic beliefs. To build a responsible system of beliefs, one must base every belief upon a rightly held foundational belief. Plantinga expresses what he sees as the main tenet of classical foundationalism: p is properly basic for S if and only if p is self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses for S. Plantinga’s objection to such a tenet is its inability to support itself by its own claim. It would seem that even this basic claim must have an even more foundational claim that it is founded on. This is a “self-referentially inconsistent” claim. The fact that the evidentialist claim is rooted in this foundational understanding of knowledge makes it untenable.

For Plantinga, the view of the Protestant Reformers, that belief in God needs no proof, is a position that, despite the objections of the evidentialist, is intellectually responsible. This position does not claim to prove the existence of God, just as the evidentialist position was not attempting to completely disprove God. Instead, the Reformed position attempts to show that belief in God is a properly basic belief. Plantinga notes that there are some who would assert that having no evidence for the existence of God would make the belief in God “groundless, or
gratuitous, or arbitrary.” To refute this claim, he looks at how we come to some other types of beliefs. In doing this, Plantinga lists the statements, I see a tree, I had breakfast this morning, that person is angry. These statements, regarding perceptions, memories, and ascribing mental states to another person, cannot be said to be founded upon irrefutable evidence. However, despite a lack of proper evidence for any of these statements, it can still reasonably be believed that the person has actually seen a tree, actually eaten breakfast earlier in the morning, or that the person they are observing is actually angry. In this respect, these statements can be considered basic beliefs. It is not he fact that the tree is there, or that breakfast was eaten, or that the person is actually angry that is basic, but rather the perceptions that reliably lead to these conclusion that are basic.

Similarly, some people can be said to perceive things about God. This would include impressions such as, God is speaking to me, God has created all this, God disapproves of me, God forgives me, God is to be thanked and praised. Plantinga would argue that these propositions could also be considered basic propositions. These are thoughts or feelings that many people have. As such, they can be seen to be just as basic as the other beliefs that have been listed regarding experience, perception, or memory. Since it has been shown that the task of classical foundationalism to find the most basic of beliefs seems impossible, Plantinga is attempting to show that there are some beliefs we must simply accept as basic. Insofar as these beliefs about God can be taken as basic, belief in the existence of God can responsibly follow from them.

To some it may seem that Plantinga’s argument is simply an elaborate attempt to deny the seemingly obvious fact that there is not sufficient evidence to prove that God exists and that the position that he does exist cannot be responsibly held. However, as obvious as this objection might appear, to raise it is to misunderstand Plantingas’s goal. His purpose is not to show that sufficient evidence actually does exist to prove God’s existence. On the contrary, he takes as an assumption that no such proof is available or even possible. His claim is that the existence of God can be legitimately taken as a basic belief upon which to build other beliefs apart from hard evidence that he actually exists. In this attempt, it would appear that Plantinga is quite successful. By demonstrating several ways in which intellectual responsibilities can be understood, he dispels the idea that belief in God must be dismissed because conclusive evidence for his existence cannot be demonstrated. Similarly, his critique of foundationalism shows that many of a person’s basic beliefs are not founded upon more basic irrefutable beliefs. By demonstrating how many basic beliefs are considered reliable simply by way of an impression or perception of them, he makes room for considering a person’s perceptions and impressions about God as basic beliefs as well. While this argument does not necessarily serve to convince an atheist that belief in God should be taken as a basic belief, it does demonstrate how belief in God could responsibly be taken as a basic belief. In accomplishing this, Plantinga defends the intellectual integrity of traditional theistic belief and legitimizes the Reformed understanding of basing all knowledge upon the existence of God.